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Wage —EmploymentContracts: Global Results
This paper studies theefficient agreements aboutthe dependence of
workers' earnings onemployment when the employmentlevel is controlled
byfirms. The firms'superior information aboutProfitability conditions isresponsible for this form of
contract governance Underplausible
assumptions, such agreements will
cause employment to divergefrom effi-.
ciency as a byproduct of their
attempt to mitigate risk. Itis shown
that,if leisure is a normalgood and firms are risk
neutral, employment
is alwaysabove theefficient level. Sucha one—period implicitcontracting
model cannot, therefore,be used to "explain"
unemployment as a rational
byproduct of risk sharing
between workers and a riskneutral firm under
conditions of asymmetricinformation.
Jerry Green










agreements specify therelationship between totalcompensation and level ofemploent, but leave thelatter under the firm'scontrol. Such
a provision forcontract governan0
may be necessary becauseinformation
about the value of thefirm's short—runproduction is noteasily perceived
and verified by labor.
This asmetry setsup a potential conflictbetween the goals of risk—sharing
and productiveefficiency In thispaper we attempt toanalyze the solution to this
problem by lookingat some properties ofthe
labor contracts thatare optimal in amodel where the firm
will choose theemploent level after itascertains some relevant
random parameters
The results can be
roughly characterized
as follows, subject ofcourse
to assumptions whoseinnocence and
Plausibility we will laterespouse:
fl There ismore emp1oent fluctuationunder the Optimalcontract
than would be observed
if employment werechosen to maximizeprofits
subject to theConstraint that worker's
utility be held constantin
all situationsThere is less income
fluctuation.
2) There is less
emploent fluctuation andmore income fluctuationthan
in the contract thatwould be implementedif all informationcould be
directly verified by bothparties.
3) The level of
employment realized is inall cases one of
"Involuntary
overtime." If workers
could recontract withthe firmex under
Conditions of smetric
information, the level ofemploent would
be lower. Inother words, the valueof the marginalproduct of
labor is always lessthan workers'
marginal valuation of theirleisure.—2—
4) Finally, although levels
of employment are higher and firms aremore
profitable in states in whichlabor is more productive,workers' util-
ity will be monotonicallYdecreasing in the firm's profitability.
"Good times" are not shared byall.
These results show that the asymmetry
of information that has been
suggested as a source of suboptimalemployment policies resultsin the
pp9site bias. It cannotbe used as a foundation for a theoryof involuntary
unemployment.
Risk sharing between firms andworkers has been a central focusof
*
the literature on implicit contracts.
In addition to a random profitability
of firms, other features treatedin various papers include: privaterather
than common knowledge of this
random fluctuation, risk aversion byfirms as
well as workers, income effects inthe demand for leisure, andrandom parameters
in workers' utility functions aswell as in firms' profit functions.The
maintained assumptions of this paper are:
i) Workers are risk averseand firms are risk neutral.
ii) Firms have complete controlof employment, ex post, becausethe in-
formation about their profitabilityis not publiclyavailable.
iii) The worker's welfare isrepresented by a single collectiveutility
function, as if a union withwell_specified risk preferences were
to strike the bargaining agreement.The actual implementation
of the agreements within the groupof workers ——forexample,
seniority rules and the wage structurefor different categories
of workers ——isnot addressed.
*
We cannot attempt any reasonable summaryof this interesting and rapidly
expanding literature here. The papersmost closely related to this one are
Pheips—CalvO (1977) and Hall—Lillien
(1979). Their results arediscussed be
low. An excellent survey ofthe research on implicit contractsis Azariadis
(1979). He mentions the problemtreated here on pp. 28—30.—3—
iv) The preferences oflabor are assumed
non—stochastic over the life
of the contract.The relevant
uncertainty affects only the value
of the firm'soutput.
v) Finally, the form offeasible contracts ishighly simplified. Com-
pensation can be made to
depend only upon the firm'scontemporan-
eous choice of employment
More complicatedarrangements in which
compensation is allowed todepend upon the duration of
unemployment,
for example, arenot Considered.
These assumptionscharacterize the structureof the model. Thequali-
tative result ofoveremployment will be thebyproduct of the positiveincome
effect on leisure.
The model is presentedin Section 2. Themain results are derivedin
Section 3. In Section 4we offer some intuitive
remarks and compare ourre-
sults to those obtainedunder differentspecificationsWe also briefly
examine the relation ofthis problem to modelsfrom the Principal_agentand
the optimal_taX0literatures.—4—
2.The Model
The relevant uncertainty is parameterizedby 0, and affects only
the value of the firm's output.Ifis the employment level, then
f(2,,0) is this value. The contractspecifies the wage paid, w(9, asa
function of employment. The net payoffto the firm is thus f(,9)
—
Withthe relevant uncertainty present
in this general form it is hard to
derive specific results. Therefore wewill treat the special case of multi—
p11cat lye
(2.1) f(,e) =0g(2)
where g is an increasing concavefunction, and 0 is a positiverandom var-
iable with a positive continuous density
over an interval. The firm is
assumed to be risk neutral, and
therefore maximizing the mathematical expec-
tation of Sg(2) —2w()is its objectiveS
Workers' utility is an increasingfunction of earnings w() and a
decreasing function of levelof employment. Because workers arerisk averse
we write their objective as
(2.2) Eu(iw(2),2')
where u is a concave function.
The expectation in (2.2) istaken with
respect to the distributionof .However,is chosen by firms.Its.
distribution will therefore depend onthe form of the entire contractand
on the distribution of 0.
Under any contract w() in any state0, the firm chooses thelevel of
employment (0) and paysthe associated wage w(Z(0)). Itis notatioflallY
simpler to work withtotal compensation than withthe—5—
wage rate; thus we define
(2.3) r() =i(o)w(i(Q))
The problem is tochoose w(.) so as to maximize
(2.4)
subject to
(2.5) E Og((o))- r(O)=c
where £(e) is definedby the solutjo to
(2.6) max f(i,) —
andr(6) is given by (2.3).By varying cParametrically, the family of effic-
ient contracts will bedelineated.
We will examine thecharacteristics of 5Olutoflsto this problem and
show that overemploymentis the typical outcome.By comparing our solution
with solutions to relatedproblems, we will ascertainsome of the qualitative
implications of informational
asymmetry and differential attitudestowards
risk. Specifically we askwhether and to what extent
profits, employment
and labor compensationare more stable in this problemthan when these fea-
tures are absent.
Before Proceeding further letus look at three simpler versionsof this
problem that will be usefulas benchmarks.
First, consider the maximization of
(2.4) subject to (2.5), but where
O) can be chosen arbitrarily.
This corresponds to thatpart of the im-
plicit contracts literature inwhich the realization ofuncertainties can
be verified by bothparties and therefore can be usedexplicitly to condi-
tion the outcomes—
Inthis case the solution can be characterized bythe two equations
(2.7) -Ogt(U))u(r(e),(O))
ur(r(O) ,(E3))
(2.8) u(r(S),9(8)) =K ,aconstant.
The former is the condition for productive
efficiency. That is, in all states
e, marginal productivity of an
extra unit of labor is equal tothe marginal
disutility of that unit. The latter equationis the condition for efficiency
in risk—bearing (BorchTs equationwhere one of the two parties isrisk neu-
tral).
Next, we can consider the originalproblem in the case when utility
takes the particular form
(2.9) u(r,) =v(r-
whereh is an increasing functiondescribing the marginal disutilityof labor
and v is an arbitrary increasing concavefunction. The utility functions
(2.9) are precisely those in which theincome elasticity of leisure demanded
(or labor supplied) is zero.
Hall and Lillien studied implicit contracting
under (2.9) in the case
when v is linear. The solution they
found applies to the case of concave v
as well. It is to set w( )andthus r( )soas to implicitly describe anin-
difference curve; that is—7—
(2.10) r —h(i)=u
It is easy to seewhy the firm's solution to its
problem automatically
satisfies (2.8). Regardless ofthe choice of 1, (2.10)guarantees that (2.8)
will hold because theargunen.t of v(.) is fixed.
The fi's choices in eachstate will also automaticallysatisfy the
productive efficiency condition.For this particularutility function, con-
dition (2.7) becomes
(2.11) eg'() h'(z)
In each state the fichooses the point of r() suchthat the marginal cost
of hiring labor is justequal to the marginal revenueproduct. Thus
(2.12) Og'(l)
And from (2.10), sinceu is constant along thecontract, we have
(2.13) r'() h'(i)
Combining (2.12) and (2.13), wesee that the profit—maximizingchoice is
invariably the Productively efficientchoice.
This sane argument can be shown
graphically. Graphs (la) and (lb) show
the firm's isoprofitcurves for two different values ofS and specify a par-
ticular contract r(). Profitsincrease to the southeast.Points A, A' are
the Profit—maximizing
points, satisfying condition (2.12).For a profit
maximizing firm to choose the
Productively efficient points thisrequires
that the slope of thecontract always be equal to theworker's marginal rate
of substitutionIn other words, u should beconstant along r(). Efficiencyr
Lo
in risk—bearing requires that Ushould be constant along r(2). Forutility
functions of the form (2.9), there is noconflict between productive efficiency
and risk—sharing, and thus, no lossdue to the private nature ofobservation
of e. With constant ur no furtherincome smoothing is desirable,thus there
is no gain to be had from furtherinsurance by the firm. Withefficient
production in all periods, thereis no Pareto_improvement to behad from re—
*
contracting.
For the first—best contract tobe incentive compatible, utilityfunctions
must be of the form (2.9). Ourfinal example is a simple instanceof what
can go wrong when (2.9) does nothold.
(2.14)
Suppose the worker's utilityfunction is additively separable
u(r,) =m(r)—n()
with m(.) concave and n(.) convex.Now condition (2.8) becomes
(2.15) m' (r) =K
*Hall and Lillien also consider the consequences
of random effects in
the utility function. In this casethey show that a contractadministered
by firms cannot implementthe full—information optimum evenwhen utility
functions are of the form (2.9).
•_ ——9--
In other words, inthis case the optimal
contract would involvepaying the
worker a fixed amount inall states of theworld. The laborrequired should
vary smoothly according to
(2.16) K/n'(i)6g'()
which is the version of
condition (2.7) for this
particular utility function.
It is easy to see thatthis contract couldnot be enforced underdifferentjai
information, Because thecontract does not provide for
any variation in
salary with respect to
working time, the firn would
always require the max—
inial amount of labor.
In subsequent sectionsof the paper we willexamine the general solution
to the problem when(2.9) does not hold andwhen in particular theincome
elasticity of leisure demanded
is Positive rather thanzero. As this third
example indicates in such
problems (2.7) and (2.8),
the risk—sharing and
productive efficiencyconditions, will be in conflict.
Thus devising a con-
tract which can be implemented
despite differentialinfoatjon will be a
second—best problem. Itssolution will entail
overemployment for all 0
(except the highest andlowest possible
values, where efficiency willhold).—10—
3. Solution
The method of solution to be usedbelow is novel in models of implicit
contracting, drawing heavily on sometechniques first developed in thelit—
***
eratureon incentive compatibilityand optimal auction design.
The idea is to regard the problem asthe choice of two functions of e,
r(O) and 9(U), instead of the singlerelation w(9). Thus we have
(3.1) max E u(r(Q), (Q))
subject to
(3.2) EQ g((O)) -r(O) c
and that, for eachO,
(3.3) max Qg(Q(O)) —r(8)occurs at 0 e
The second set of constraintscorresponds to (2.6).
*
SeeWilson (1977), Riley and Samuelsofl
(1979),for an introduction to
the auction design problem. Stochastic
auction designs have been treated
by Maskin, Riley and Weitzman(1979).
**
Onincentive compatibility see Greenand Laffont (1979) and Laffont
and Maskin (1980), where the treatmentof the continuous_parameter problem
is closest to what will be used here.—11—
It is clear thatgiven any Solution of the
original problem we can de-
fine r(6) and £(e)by the values these
variables actually takeon for each
value of 8, and thenr(O), £(8) will solve (3.1)—(3.3).Conversely, if we
can arrange for a "truthtelljng"
solution r(O), (e) to(3.1) —(3.3),then
the implicit relation
(3.4) r() E r(())
where '(Z) is the valueof U such that (O)£, gives us a solutjo tothe
original problem. It mustonly be insured that thisinverse is well defined.
We will see below thatthis is not a problem
because any solutionto (3.1) —
(3.3)will satisfy
(3.5) i'(U) > 0
by virtue of the secondorder conditions
necessary for (3.3) to hold.*
The next step is toreplace (3.3) by the statemeitthat the first and
second order conditions forthat problem holdas identities in at e e.
These are
(3.6) &g'(i(e)) '(e) -r(U) 0
and
(3.7) eg"(i(e)) ((e))2 +og'((Q))"(6)—r"()<0
Since (3.6) is anidentity in , we can differentiateit to obtain an
*
There is no a priorireason to restrict contracts w()to functions; for some problems
correspondences might work better.Furthermore, two con- tracts w ()andw ()whichdiffer only on portions whichare never chosen in any state are t allintents and purposes equivalentsThus in cases (un- like the present one) wherethere is not an exactequivalence between the w() formulation and the(w(e), (e)) formulation it wouldseem that it is the latter that is themore fundamental specification.—12—
expression for r"(@).Substituting this in (3.7) we canthen rewrite the
second order conditions as
g'(9.(O))Q'() >0
or simply '(e) >0by the monotonicitY of gIn this way we see that (3.5)
is automatically satisfied,and can be dropped as an explicitconstraint in
the maximization.
The problem we solve is tomaximize (3.1) subject to (3.2)and






In this notation the problemis
(3.10) max E v(r,y)
subject to
(3.11) E{Oy —r}c
(3.12) By' —r' o. for all B
*
Forthe purposes of this exposition,we are simply thatthe
constraint (3.5) is nowherebinding. A complete solution,
taking this con-
straint into account is
considerably messier. Such asolution will be com-
posed of two types ofsubportiOnS. In regionsofover which (3.5) is not
binding, the contract willcontinue to satisfy equations
of the form of (3.14)
(3.16). In regions in which(3.5) is binding, both1 and r will be constant.
The resultant contract curveswill be similar to those
described in the text,
but they will be kinked atcertain points. The conclusions
we derive will not
be affected.
We are also ignoring the
possibility of discontinuouscontract curves.
It turns out that havingincome a normal good is
sufficient for a continuous
contract to be optimal.
These issues will bediscussed more fully in a subsequentpaper.—1 3—
Because v isconcave and because the
restrictions arelinear, the first order
conditions and the
transversality conditionsare sufficient fora maximum,
(see Ewing (1969),pp. 129—131).
Writing the Lagrangian
expression
(3.13) E{v(r(O), y(8)) + f(s)(r'(O) -Oy'(O))+ K(Sy(S) -r(@)-c)}










where a and bare the endpoints ofthe support of thedistribution of s.indcr reasonablesmoothness assumptions,
these equations willyield uniquecontinuou3, smooth solutionsf(s),g(8),r(S). Expressions(3.14) and (3.15)can be com- bined to yield
(3.19) v +vB+f0
y r
As efficiencyrequires V + vU =0,the bias of
employment away from the
efficient level
depends solely on thesign of the function f.If f > 0 we
have overemployment:the value of the
marginal product oflabor, Og', falls short of the rateat which labormust be compensatedon the margin
_U/Ur•—14—
By definition U/Ur Vyt/V
and thus £ > 0 implies V +ye<0, or,
—u9. Og' < —
Wenow turn to a proof ofthis main result ——thatindeed f > 0, except
at a and b where £ =0,and thus that overemploYment alwaysobtains.
Differentiating (3.l4)with respect to0 we have
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The condition that leisure demandbe a normal good is just
(3.21) (urr + u9.)< 0
Since UE v ,u=vg', u=vg' and g' > 0, the first twobracketed
rr rr 9. y r9. ry





Moreover, since y' > 0, we knowthat if £0 then f"<0.It follows that
if £ has a zero between a and b, oneof the two transversalitY conditions
must fail. (For example, if f(e) =0for a < e < b and f'(e) < 0,then—15--
> f(b) < (b—e)f'(e) <0.) Thus f =0and, in particular, f >0 for all 0 in
the interior f Acorollary is that u decreas
as 6 increases along
the contract
The function fcan also be used to derive
information about ualong r the contract
From (3.14) we knowthat V = +Kand we can show that
KE
Vr• Since we know from the above
theorem that f'(a) >0 and f'(b) < 0,
these relationsare sufficient to showthat for 0 neara u is greater than
its average valueand for 0 near b
Ur is less than its average values
*
If we knew that f"were less than zero
everhere, we could easily show that u declines
along the entire lengthof the contract.But this need not hoid ingenera', and so the claim
can only be made near theend- points.—16—
4. Intuition and Comparison with Other Results
The discussion above has been quite abstract, yet theintuition behind
the overemployment result is actually very clear.The diagram below repre-
sents the utility function of workers, increasing tothe northwest.
The curve u is an indifference curve, and u is aconstant marginal utility of
income locus. When leisure is a normal good U musthave a smaller slope
(algebraically) than u. Moving northeastward along u,the marginal utility
of income declines.
If u were implemented as the contract we would alwayshave productive
efficiency but U would not be constant. Thefirst—best contract would lie
along u, but if we left it to a profit_maximizingfirm to implement ur as
a contract we would have efficiency inrisk bearing, but not in production.
The firm would profit maximize by setting marginal productequal to the slope
of the contract not of the indifference curve. Becauseof the relationship
between these two slopes, the level of employmentis too high under the U
contract.
2—17--
The solutj of ourproblem ,C ,iill producea compromise between u and —*
Ur• But, as this will still be less
than u, it will still be
characterizedly
by overemployment for all0.
We can now justify claims
1) and 2) of the introductionFirst let us
compare the optimal contract c with
any constant utility contract whosepath
it crosses:
8
LetA and B be the locus of
points (r,) such that
u/u1a and b respectively.
As long as leisure isa normal good these curvesmove leftward with increases
in Utility. We know from
the transversaljty conditionsthat under contract c
the endpoints areon these loci. Similarly, ina constant utilitycontract,
since productive efficiencyis achieved at alltimes, the firm's choices at
0a and 0 =balso lie on these locj.Thus when leisure isa normal good,
the spread between 1(b)and 1(a) is greater in theoptimal contract than in
the constant utilitycontract.
When income is a normalgood (so that A and B moveupward with increases
in u, as they do in thediagram), then a similar
argument demonstrates that
*
If f" is always
negative, then the_slope of theoptimal contract at any point lies between theslopes of the u curve and ofthe u curve through that point.
C 1
;1/—18—
r(b) —r(a)is smallerinthe optimal contract than in the constantutility
contract.
Because Ur is not necessarilymonotonic, we cannot make quite as general
a claim for arbitrary ucrossed by the optimal contract, but we canmake
an analogous argument if we
stick to the locus of constant U at avalue
equal to EUr along the contract curve.
Compare the second—best optimalcontract and its associated Eurlevel
with a first—best contract at which uis identically equal to this Eu
r
r
Efficiency once again guaranteesthat the endpoints of the contractlie on
A and B. And from the conclusionsof the previous section we knowthat the
contract C must start with a higher uat a and end with a lower u atb.
r r
Thus if leisure is a normal good,the variation of employment is greater
along the 'first—best than alongthe second—best contract. If incomeis a




In the papers byGrossman and hart (1980)and Azariadis (1980),under-
employment is shown to bethe rule. Thesepapers use the no Incomeeffect
utility function but introduce
risk aversion on thepart of firms. The same
diagram is useful toexplain these results:
Now u and
Ur coincide. But efficiency in
riskbearjng requires u/'to be
Constant, where is the marginal
utility of profit. Profit
is increasing in
0, and £'(O)>0, so we know that 'will be decreasingas we move north-
eastward along thecontract. To keep u/'
constant, Ur must decrease with£
as well. This means that
the locus where u /'is constant mustCut u from r
r below. A Contractwithu/'constant is thus one with
underemploymentCom-
bining both goals in thesecondbest problem willstill produce underemployme
This seems to be the
appropriate point at which torelate this model to
the Principal_agentliterature and to theproblem of optimal incometaxation
In our problem the"agent" is the firm whohas Proprietaryinformation. With
a risk neutral agentwe expect full efficiencyto be feasible. Buthere, the
"effort" of the
agent, choosing I, entersdirectly into the principal'swelfare
and not only indirectlythrough its influence
on "output", which here istotal
r—20—
revenue to be shared (Og(9(O)).It is this composition of an externality
problem with an incentive problemthat gives the model its second—bestcharacter.
*
Comparisonwith the optimal income tax literatureis more difficult.
There are, indeed, many more
similarities than differences. If wethink of 8
as distinguishing varoius typesof individuals according to theirproductivitYi
then the optimal ta probleifliS
to find a schedule of taxes tomaximize
[u (r,) dO such that E 9.9.-rC
Here r is net income and so 9.—ris tax received from individualsof type 9.
•The firm in our problem under
different circumstanCes 9 is likethe workers
in an optimal income tax problem
with different levels of ability.The constraint
of keeping workers' expected
utility above a fixed levelcorresponds to the
constraint of raising a fixed amountof revenue from the income tax.The firm's
choice of 9.alonga fixed (r,9. )scheduleis like the workers' choice of
when faced with a fixed relationbetween before and after taxincome.
In the taxation literaturethere is no direct way of observingthe individual's
type and thus tax functionsmust rely on charging accordingto observable
characteristics. This creates anincentive problem analogous to the onewe
have discussed. We must allowthe firm to choose its preferredcombination of
w andin each state along the contract givenit; the government presents a
tax schedule to its citizensand then must allow the individualseach to choose
the level of work and net incomethey prefer along it.
Thus the problems are extremely
close formally. Where then are
the differences? What is the special structureof our
*MirrleeS(1971), (1979). Our use ofthe transversalitY condition
mirrors the investigation bySeade (1977).—21—
problem that causes
overeniployment to result? Whyisthis result sensitive
to the income elasticity
of leisure demand whereasit is the priceelasticity
that determjnes thedeparture of optimal Incometaxation.rom the first—best
of lU1np—suu taxation ofability?
The details of the optimaltax problem differ because theparameters
which are controlled by theschedule are different: In thetax system the
schedule specifies net incomenot as a function of hours worked,butas a
function of gross income wI.This single difference issufficient to make the
tax problem sensitive not to the
income elasticity of leisure, butto the
price elasticity of leisure. Indeedif we considered theoptimal form of a
tax not on income but on hoursworked, the results would becompletely
analogous to ours. We couldsay that the second—best optimal labor
tax,
adjusted to the incentive problem
would always result inunderemployent—22—
5. Conc1us
Since its beginnings, the implicit
contracts literature has had the
explanation of unemploymentand wage rigidity as its goal.The intention
was to offer a structureunder which wage rigidity is optimal,and in which
unemployment follows as aresult. To some extent these goals wereachieved,
but, it is safe to say, always byintroducing some special features
in the contracting process that were
not obviously an essential partof the
model. For example, a commondevice is a two—period structurein which the
contract operates somewhat
differently in the second periodthan in the first.
In this paper we have given what webelieve to be the first results using
the implicit contracts theme whichdoes not rely on any of these structural
conditions. Paradoxically, the interactionof differential risk aversion
and incomplete information is preciselythe opposite of the original inten-
tion. Long term relationships betweenemployers and workers increase em-
ployment variability, resulting
in more employment that would be ex post
efficiert when profitability conditions areadverse. Thus, the
implicit contracts theory may not yield
the underpinnings for a theory of
macroeconomic fluctuations.—23—
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